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COMMENT
THE FAILURE OF THE WORK INCENTIVE
(WIN) PROGRAM
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the Work Incentive Program (WIN) ' was enacted
as part of the 1967 amendments to title IV of the Social Security Act,
law review commentary pessimistically assessed its prospects for
success.' This Comment will confirm the predictions of failure:
enough facts are in to point up WIN as yet another ill-conceived pro-
gram designed to counter poverty in America. The lesson of WIN is
not that a congressional program can fail, but rather that an antipoverty
program founded upon the same faulty premises of previous unsuccess-
ful schemes was doomed from the outset.
In broadest terms, WIN is a "service" program as distinguished
from one providing purely monetary aid to the poor. Originally en-
titled "Grants to States for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), title
IV was enacted to enable "each State to furnish financial assistance, as
far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy de-
pendent children."' 3  Matching funds for social services to strengthen
the family unit were first authorized in 1956,4 when payments for the
support of parents of dependent children were also first provided.'
Section 401, setting forth the purposes of the Act, was amended to
reflect this profound change:
[To encourage] the care of dependent children in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to
furnish financial assistance and other services, as far as prac-
lAct of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204, 81 Stat. 884-92, amending 42
U.S.C. §602(a) (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (8) (19), 630-44 (Supp. V,
1970)). Although enacted on Jan. 2, 1968, the Act is entitled "Social Security
Amendments of 1967."
2 See Note, Compulsory Work for Welfare Recipients Under the Social Security
Amendments of 1967, 4 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 197 (1968); Comment, Public
Welfare "WIN" Program: Ann-Twisting Incentives, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1062 (1969).
3 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 401, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (Supp. V. 1970) (emphasis added). Provision of solely financial aid for the
support of needy children was the paramount concern of the Act. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12 (1935); S. REa. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16-17 (1935).
4 Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 836, § 312, 70 Stat. 848-49, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601, 602(a) (13), 603(a) (Supp. V, 1970). Services to recipients of ADC were
provided long before authorized by statute in 1956: "The first concrete federal
incentive for provision of 'services' appeared in State Letter 25 of 1943, which
authorized inclusion of costs of services in state administrative expenses for federal
matching." Gilbert, Policy-Making in Public Welfare: The 1962 Amenments,
81 PoL. Sci. Q. 196, 201 (1966) (footnote omitted).
5Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 836, §§312(a), (c), 70 Stat. 848-49, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 603(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
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ticable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent
children and the parents or relatives with whom they are
living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain the maximum self-support
and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of
continuing parental care and protection . ... '
Social services to the family and financial support of the parents of
ADC children were intended to improve the home environment of
needy children; a second goal was to boost adult ADC recipients toward
economic independence. 7 The states were not required to implement
the authorized services.
The 1962 public welfare amendments 8 placed heavy emphasis on
service programs to the family,9 and in effect compelled the states to
provide them.:' The services were intended
to improve the rehabilitative aspects of the public assistance
programs particularly in stimulating constructive services de-
signed to help families and individuals to attain self-suffi-
ciency. . . These social services . . . are designed to help
families and individuals to become self-supporting rather than
dependent upon welfare checks.'
The name of the program was accordingly changed to "Grants to
States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children," and the
assistance provided was designated "Aid to Families with Dependent
Children" (AFDC) 12
The 1962 amendments also authorized funding for a new pro-
gram "a designed to
6 Id. § 312(a), 70 Stat. 848-49, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. V, 1970).
7 The Senate committee report explained:
Services that assist families and individuals to attain the maximum economic
and personal independence of which they are capable provide a more satis-
factory way of living for the recipients affected. To the extent that they
can remove or ameliorate the causes of dependency they will decrease the
time that assistance is needed and the amounts needed.
S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1956).
8 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172-208 (codified in scattered
sections of ch. 7, 42 U.S.C.).
9 The services envisioned were primarily those of casework counseling. That is,
the welfare caseworker became obliged to do more than simply provide a check:
he was supposed to become more involved in solving the recipient family's problems,
be they childrearing, housework, budgeting, or whatever. See S. REP. No. 1589,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1962).
10 The federal government was to bear 75% of the cost of basic rehabilitative
services. A state not providing such services would lose half of its federal funding
for its entire welfare plan. Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §§ 101 (a) (2),
(b) (1) (B), 76 Stat. 174-76, 179, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 303(a) (4)-(5) (1964),
as amended, (Supp. V, 1970) ; S. REP. No. 1589, supra note 9, at 7.
11 S. REP. No. 1589, supra note 9, at 7.
12 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §§ 104(a) (1)- (3), 76 Stat. 185-86.
18 State or locally financed work-related programs did exist prior to 1962.
S. REP. No. 1589, supra note 9, at 11.
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[encourage,] through community work and training pro-
grams [CWT] of a constructive nature, the conservation of
work skills and the development of new skills for individuals
who . . are receiving aid to families with dependent
children .... 14
The work projects were to be useful and the workers not exploited:
[T] he payment for the work must be at rates not less than
the minimum rate under State law, or not less than the pre-
vailing rates on similar work in the community; the projects
will have to serve a useful purpose, not result in the displace-
ment of regular workers or substitute for work that would
otherwise be performed by local workers .... :"
Although the CWT program was primarily for unemployed fathers,
states were allowed to open the program to eligible mothers."
Five years after the enactment of the rehabilitative services and
CWT provisions, the 1967 Social Security amendments-including
WIN-were passed without serious congressional criticism of con-
ditioning welfare eligibility on a willingness to work. The goal, as
stated in section 430 of the Act, was to restore the families of indi-
viduals enrolled in the program to
independence and useful roles in their communities. It is
expected that individuals participating in the program . . .
will acquire a sense of dignity, self-worth, and confidence
which will flow from being recognized as a wage-earning
member of society and that the example of a working adult
in these families will have beneficial effects on the children
in such families.'
7
One tenuous assumption, then, is explicit in the Act: that a work-
ing parent inevitably provides a good example-that is, imparts respect
for a work ethic-to the children in the family. Other assumptions
behind the Act, to varying degrees more implicit, are less contro-
versially erroneous. Congress apparently believed that many AFDC
14 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 105 (a), 76 Stat. 186. This pro-
vision became 42 U.S.C. § 609, which became inoperative after June 30, 1968. Act of
Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204(c) (2), 81 Stat. 892.
15S. REP. No. 1589, supra note 9, at 12; see Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-543, § 105(a), 76 Stat. 186-87, discussed at note 14 supra.
16 S. REP. No. 1589, supra note 9, at 12.
-7 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, §204(a), 81 Stat. 884 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 630 (Supp. V, 1970)).
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recipients 18 were not working because of either indolence "9 or lack of
training; 2 0 that is, many recipients were immediately employable, or
at least immediately trainable for work. Another assumption was that
WIN's training program would raise the vocational skills of recipients
to employable levels; another, that the economy is sufficiently flexible
to absorb immediately recipients who could work right away as well
as recipients whom the program would train; and finally, that the jobs
obtained through the WIN program would enable the recipients to
I8 The precise number of expected WIN trainees was never definitively set.
Labor Department estimates to the conferees on the WIN amendments predicted a
total of 757,000 trained WIN graduates located in employment by the end of fiscal
1972. SENATE CoMM. ON FINANCE & HOUSE CoMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 90TI
CONG., 1ST SESS., SUMMARY OF SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967, at 29 (Comm.
Print 1967); CONF. REP. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1967). There were
other, higher estimates. The Senate version of the bill was expected to produce
860,000 WIN trainees by the end of fiscal 1972. S. REp. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 153 (1967). HEW also issued high estimates:
From 1969 to 1974, an estimated 5.4 million AFDC recipients are expected
to become "potentially eligible" to enter the program. If the WIN program
is expanded promptly and operated at a maximum capacity, it may be assumed
that all of these "potentially eligible" persons could be enrolled sometime
during this 6-year period.
F. Arner, The Work Incentive (WIN) Program: Establishment and Early Imple-
mentation 69, June 5, 1969 (Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service ed.
378) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Health, Education, and
Welfare Accomplishments, 1963-68, Problems and Challenges, and a Look to the
Future (1968)). "Underlying these estimates is an HEW assumption of 80 to
85% participation of the mothers and a somewhat higher percentage participation of
the fathers and out-of-school youth." F. Arner, supra at 69.
As a result of their employment, an estimated 900,000 to 1 million persons
might be expected to secure employment and become fully self-supporting.
When account is taken of their families, these employed persons could repre-
sent a reduction of 3 to 4 million persons on AFDC rolls over the 6-year
period.
Id. 70 (quoting HEW Accomplishments, spra at 112). See also Auerbach Corpora-
tion, Summary of Remarks by David Miller & William Cameron at an Interagency
Briefing on the Work Incentive Program (WIN) at the Department of Labor 3,
Sept. 17, 1969 (reading the WIN program to assume that, at least in theory, all
AFDC recipients are employable or trainable) [hereinafter cited as Auerbach
Briefing]. The Auerbach Corporation was engaged by both HEW and the Dep't of
Labor to make an intensive evaluation of WIN programs across the country. Id. 1.
19 Of course, welfare recipients have never been congressionally branded as ex-
plicitly "lazy," but the intimation is not lacking. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 12080
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 940 (1967)
(remarks of Chairman Long) [hereinafter cited as Senate WIN Hearings] :
There are a great number of people drawing public assistance who could
be doing something more, and we ought to be affirmatively moving those
people to doing the best things we can put them to, even if that is nothing
more than helping to get rid of the rats, or to get the garbage out of the
place. It is still better than leaving the rats around and having the place
smelling.
The mandatory nature of WIN is perhaps- of itself an indication that Congress believed
that a voluntary program would lack participants because many recipients are lazy.
20 Based on the work experience programs that have been operating for
several years, we have every reason to believe that there are many more
individuals who want to be and can be trained and employed.
Id., pt. 1, at 215 (remarks of Wilbur J. Cohen, Undersec'y of HEW). "[A] great
many mothers, as well as virtually all unemployed fathers, of AFDC children can
be trained for a place in productive employment." H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 97 (1967).
[Voi.119:485
1971] THE FAILURE OF THE WORK INCENTIVE (WIN) PROGRAM 489
earn enough to leave the relief rolls. 1 Certainly a congressional pro-
gram may succeed despite its incorrect underlying assumptions. But
serendipity is the exception; the failure of the WIN program is tied
intimately to its faulty premises. Perhaps most disappointing about
the WIN program is neither its failure nor its unwarranted assump-
tions, but its reflection of a misconceived belief, apparently endemic to
congressional as well as popular thinking, that poverty is a manifesta-
tion of a personal failure to live according to an American model,
rather than a problem produced by societal malfunctions and remediable
only by societal reconstruction.
The next section of this Comment will describe the operation of
the WIN program as planned and as implemented. Then the assump-
tions listed above as immediately pertinent to WIN will be measured
against the program's current produce.
II. THE MECHANICS OF WIN
WIN is administered by HEW and the Department of Labor.
Each department is responsible for different aspects of the program.
The process begins when the state welfare agency evaluates adult
AFDC recipients to determine which are "appropriate" 22 for referral
to the program. Federal regulations require that the states evaluate
individuals in a specified order,2 3 beginning with AFDC unemployed
fathers. Mothers and other caretaker relatives who volunteer for WIN
and are currently in a program under title V of the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act 4 or in a CWT program are evaluated next. Presumably
these individuals are already motivated to work or to be trained and
have access to child care programs. The third group comprises "[d] e-
pendent children and essential persons age 16 or over who are not in
school, at work, or in training, and for whom there are no educational
plans under consideration." ' Mothers who volunteer but are not
already in existing training programs constitute the next group if they
have no pre-school-age children, and the fifth group if they do. There-
after, the state welfare agency may evaluate for referral any other
recipients.
Of the five groups, the regulations require assessment of only the
first (unemployed fathers) and third (youth and essential persons 16
or over).6 States need not assess any other individuals, but if they
do, they must follow the prescribed order.
2 1 See, e.g., F. Arner, supra note 18, at 70 (quoting HEW Accomplishments, supra
note 18, at 112); S. RFP,. No. 744, supra note 18, at 158 ("[T]bis provision wil
furnish incentives for members of public assistance to take employment and, in many
cases, increase their earnings to the point where they become self-supporting.").
22Social Security Act §§402(a) (19) (A) (i), (ii), 42 U.S.C. §§602(a) (19) (A)
(i), (ii) (Supp. V, 1970).
23U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Guidelines for the Work Incentive
Program § 61.1 (1969).
242 U.S.C. §§2921-33 (Supp. V, 1970).
2 45 C.F.R. §220.35(a) (3) (iii) (1970).
260Id. § 220.35 (a) (iv)- (v).
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Welfare caseworkers interview recipients and ostensibly select for
enrollment in WIN only those most likely to succeed in the program."'
The caseworker is familiar with the history, work experience, family
needs, emotional stability, and other factors relevant to the recipient's
appropriateness. But caseworkers are not manpower employment
specialists and the standards of employability or trainability are not
objective; thus the complex decision of appropriateness is left largely
to the caseworker's intuition. The number of recipients referred by the
state welfare agencies as appropriate consequently varies greatly from
state to state,28 and only 43.9 percent of those referred by the state
agencies are ultimately enrolled in WIN. 9
Recipients found appropriate by the state agencies are next re-
ferred " to the Local Bureau of Employment Services (under the
supervision of the Department of Labor), which conducts its own
assessment of appropriateness. This reevaluation determines whether
the individuals are immediately employable or suitable for other man-
power programs or need specialized services 3- (or are inappropriate
for WIN, in which case they are referred back to the welfare agencies).
This assessment is conducted by an employability team comprising a
counselor, manpower training specialist, job developer, and coach. The
team draws up an employability development plan for each individual
which "will best meet the needs for employment in a job the trainee
desires and is capable of performing. The team concept provides for
a controlled caseload allowing sufficient time for work with the
trainees." 2
27 The selection process is described in Manpower Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Bureau of Work and Training Programs Manual ch. 9 (WIN Handbook), § 19
(1968) [hereinafter cited as BWTP Manual].
28 The variations among the states in finding AFDC recipients appropriate are
staggering. Nevada and New Hampshire are the lowest states, finding only 5.8%
and 6.1 _ of their recipients appropriate; West Virginia and Oregon are highest,
finding 93.0% and 91.0% appropriate. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare,
Social and Rehabilitation Services Monthly Status Reports for WIN (May 31,
1970) [hereinafter cited as Monthly Status Reports for WIN (May 31, 1970)].
29Id.
30 Many recipients considered appropriate for referral by the state agencies are
not actually referred. See text accompanying note 67 infra (table I). The disparity
may be explained in part by
the fact that some individuals found appropriate become inappropriate before
they can be referred; and a reluctance on the part of the local welfare
agencies to refer additional individuals as enrollments approach the maximum
number of training spaces available.
J. Lynch, Statistical Data on Welfare Aspects of Work Incentive Program for
AFDC Recipients, Selected Periods Within Fiscal Year 1969, at 2, 1969 (Nat'l
Center for Social Statistics, Social & Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ., & Welfare, Rep. H-2(69)). As of March 1970, however, these factors only
accounted for approximately 25% of the appropriate AFDC recipients never ultimately
referred to WIN by the local Bureau after reassessment. STAFF OF THE SENATE
Comm. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., MATERIAL RELATED TO WORK AND TRAIN-
ING PROVISIONS OF ADMINISTRATION REVISION OF H.R. 16311, at 5 (Comm. Print
1970) [hereinafter cited as FINANCE COMM. STAFF MATERIAL].
31 BWTP Manual §§ 511-12.
32 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Work Incentive Briefing Paper 2, Dec. 15, 1969.
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As the employability development plan progresses, individuals are
separated into three "priorities." 3 Those who are immediately
employable and have work skills needed in the local labor market, or
who can enter on-the-job training positions in existing federal pro-
grams,"4 are either found employment or placed in federal manpower
programs. These enrollees receive supportive services (such as coun-
seling) for a minimum of ninety days and, in computing their
welfare needs, may disregard the first thirty dollars of their earned
income and one third of the remainder. 6
The second priority includes enrollees needing special training to
be employable.3 7 Enrollees in this priority fall into either occupational
or pre-occupational training. The former includes union apprentice-
ships, advanced institutional training in a particular skill,38 or institu-
tional training in a new basic skill such as simple typing or filing,39 or
training for a job requiring no formal skill,4" such as nurse's or teacher's
aide. Pre-occupational programs provide extensive preparatory train-
ing, including basic orientation to work experience ' (how to act dur-
ing a job interview, how to relate to fellow employees, employers'
expectations), exploration of ability by job tryouts and work samples,42
and acquisition of basic educational tools.4 3 All enrollees in this second
priority receive a monthly incentive payment of thirty dollars in addi-
tion to their welfare grants.4
Recipients who cannot benefit from training and for whom jobs
in the economy cannot be located-but who have nonetheless been
found appropriate for WIN-are placed in "special works projects,"
the third priority. Public agencies or private nonprofit agencies organ-
33 S. REP. No. 744, supra note 18, at 147-55. The statutory provision incorporat-
ing these priorities is Social Security Act §432(b), 42 U.S.C. §632(b) (Supp. V,
1970).
34 S. REP. No. 744, spra note 18, at 149.
35 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Work Incentive Briefing Paper 2, Dec. 15, 1969.
30 Social Security Act § 402(a) (8) (A) (ii), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (A) (ii)
(Supp. V, 1970).
37 S. REP. No. 744, sitpra note 18, at 149.
38 U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Work Incentive Program: First Annual Report
of the Dep't of Labor to the Congress on Training and Employment Under Title
IV of the Social Security Act 9, June 1970 [hereinafter cited as WIN First Annual
Report]; BWTP Manual § 514.3.
39 See WIN First Annual Report 9; BWTP Manual § 514.3.
40 See WIN First Annual Report 11; BWTP Manual § 514.4.
41WIN First Annual Report 8; BWTP Manual § 514.5.
42 WIN First Annual Report 10-11; BWTP Manual § 5142.
43 WIN First Annual Report 9; BWTP Manual § 515. "Educational services
are provided to those recipients lacking the minimum education necessary to obtain
a job or participate in further training." WIN First Annual Report 9. One part
of the educational training provides a high school equivalency diploma ("General
Educational Development," or GED); this type of education may continue even
after the educational level of the enrollee enables him to begin training. See id. 5.
44 Social Security Act §402(a)(19)(D)(i), 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(19)(D)(i)
(Supp. V, 1970).
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ized for a public purpose can employ these enrollees, who "in most
instances . . . would no longer receive a welfare check." " Instead,
they receive a payment from an employer for services performed. A
supplemental grant will be made, if necessary, to bring their wages to a
level twenty percent above their welfare grant level.4" They are also
reimbursed for any expenses incurred due to participation in the pro-
gram. 7  If an enrollee's employability development plan bogs down,
he may be sidetracked, perhaps for months, in a "holding" status; s
no incentive payments are made to these enrollees.
In some respects WIN is an innovative manpower program. The
financial incentive is a noteworthy departure from previous antipoverty
programs,49 and WIN provides an organized approach to provision of
manpower services which other antipoverty manpower programs pro-
vide separately. The concept of an employment team has been found
particularly effective in providing assistance to multiproblem welfare
recipients.50
But like the CWT Program, which was intended "to enrich and
expand [manpower] programs and provide various services which
would help rehabilitate the . . . recipients" "' but which actually re-
sulted in "little training and meaningless work experience," 52 WIN
has encountered numerous difficulties." A recent evaluation indicates
that the chronically unemployed rarely successfully complete the WIN
training programs and find stable employment." What were innova-
tions on paper have often not materialized. For example, the highly
touted concept of an employability team providing individualized atten-
45 S. REP. No. 744, supra note 18, at 150.
46 Social Security Act §§ 402(a) (19) (D) (i), (E) (ii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19)
(D) (i), (E) (ii) (Supp. V, 1970).
41TSocial Security Act §§402(a)(7), (19) (D) (ii), 42 U.S.C. §§602(a)(7),
(19) (D) (ii) (Supp. V, 1970).
4SSee WIN First Annual Report 8, 10, 30-32.
49 Under title V of the Economic Opportunity Act, any earnings were deducted
from the welfare grant. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2981 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970)
(title V not included in income disregard provision of the Act). "These deductions
[were] tantamount to a 100 percent tax on income and therefore discourage[d] any
effort to secure employment. The system may actually [have] penalize[d] efforts
on the part of recipients to attain economic independence." S. LEVITAN, ANTIPOVERTY
WORK AND TRAINING EFFORTS: GOALS AND REALITIES 99 (1967).
50 WIN First Annual Report 4-7.
51 S. LEVITAN, supra note 49, at 68.
52 Hausman, The AFDC Amendments of 1967: Their Impact on the Capacity
for Self-Support and the Employability of AFDC Family Heads, 19 LAa. L.J. 496,
506 (1968). WIN is "an old program under a new label." Id. Other older work
relief programs have manifested similar failures. See S. LEMrTAN, supra note 49, at
74.
>3 Auerbach Corporation, Report on WIN Program: Supplement to Oral Presen-
tation, pt. 2, at 4, Apr. 24, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Auerbach Report].
5 4 Id.
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tion has frequently not been realized. "Some [local WIN offices] use
'assembly line' tactics, keeping enrollees together in 'classes' and send-
ing them through the same sequence of [pre-occupational training]
components at the same pace." 5 In some areas the team concept has
been altogether abandoned, sometimes because of friction among team
members over seniority rights in decisionmaking. "6 When teams are
used, enrollee contact with all of the members (particularly with the
manpower specialist) is often negligible.
57
Ideally the employability development plan would bring to an
enrollee's aid the combined talent of the members of the team. But
such plans may never be drawn for some enrollees. In the "great
majority" of cases examined by one group of researchers, the files con-
tained no employability plans at all.5"
The orientation component of pre-occupational training in most
cases apparently serves the highly useful function of introducing pre-
viously unemployed recipients to the world of work. But "[o] rienta-
tion is sometimes used thoughtlessly as a convenient catch-all for
enrollees which enables the WIN staff to 'buy time' to develop employ-
ability plans." ;1 When this component is incorrectly used, its value
is quickly lost. In some cases orientation training appears to the
enrollees as merely a personal attack or stigma where the employability
team is "trying to tell me I don't dress right, or talk right" for little
reason at all.'
The educational training component is likewise used as a holding
ground for enrollees. Its relation to employability is sometimes doubt-
ful."' Some WIN offices use traditional classroom techniques which
may make some recipients feel that they are "going back to school"
rather than training for a job. On the other hand, some WIN educa-
tion programs begin at too advanced a level for the recipients. 2
The occupational training programs have also run into trouble.
Studies suggest that job training has not taken into account enrollees'
existing skills, and that enrollees are forced to enter training classes
below their level.
65 Auerbach Briefing 6. But see Division of Program Review & Analysis, Office
of Evaluation, U.S. Dep't of Labor, WIN Program Review After One Year 2,
Oct. 22, 1969 [hereinafter cited as WIN Review].
56 Auerbach Report, pt. 2, at 5.
5 7 Cf. id.; WIN Review 25.
58 Auerbach Report, pt. 2, at 6; see WIN Review 2.
59 Auerbach Report, pt. 2, at 7.
6o Id.
61 Id., pt. 1, at 9.
62 1d., pt. 2, at 7. "Programs for both Basic Education and High School
Equivalency have been largely 'standard' packages, which may fail to meet the needs
of welfare recipients." WIN First Annual Report 30-31.
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[V]irtually no accommodations are made for either uncon-
ventional past experience or past training . . . . Little
attempt was made to build on past enrollee experience, even
though some enrollees listed "substantial work experience in
the field of his (their) vocational choice." After duly noting
same, [employability teams] went right ahead and enrolled
people in training for that very field: a machinist in a
machinist's course . . . . Previously trained people fared
worse. Despite protestations, one young lady who had taken
typing in high school and graduated less than a year ago was
enrolled in a clerk-general course and promptly typed fifty-
seven words per minute in the first of twenty-six weeks.
Other clients fully or partially trained by OIC [Opportunities
Industrialization Centers], EOA [Economic Opportunity
Act], and other agencies were often assigned to the same
fields they had allegedly trained for. On the basis of test
results, all started at the beginning of these courses. Three
months in clerk-general at OIC . . . counted nothing.
The area of vocational choice provides the worst ex-
ample of the "beneficient" manipulation of clients by WIN
employees on the basis of unrevised, outmoded and often
inapplicable standards.6 3
III. I EASURES OF SUCCESS
Behind the WIN program lay Congress' belief that many adult
AFDC recipients were immediately employable without training or at
least immediately trainable for work." By the end of fiscal 1970,
150,000 AFDC recipients were to have been trained by WIN; by the
end of fiscal 1971, an additional 190,000. By the end of fiscal 1972,
a cumulative total of 757,000.65 These estimates appear slightly
ridiculous today: in fact the WIN selection process has not uncovered
a sizeable body of recipients appropriate for the program.6 Table I
shows the number of recipients eliminated from consideration at each
step of the selection process. The figures include the first two years
of WIN's operation, when presumably most of the appropriate re-
cipients would be discovered and enrolled in WIN.
63 Auerbach Corporation, Resident Observation: The Work Incentive Program,
Florence Office, Los Angeles County 6-18 to -19, Mar. 15, 1970 (report submitted
to Office of Evaluation, Manpower Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor).
64 See notes 18-20 supra & accompanying text.
65 CONF. REP. No. 1030, supra note 18, at 59. To date, "the program has had
a history of missed estimates and revised estimates, only to be missed again." F. Arner,
supra note 18, at 74. For other estimates of the number of WIN enrollees, see
note 18 supra.
"The Labor Department's estimate of 150,000 trainees by the end of fiscal 1970
was revised in 1969 to 77,000. The actual number of trainees by the end of fiscal
1970 was 42,000. FINANCE COMM. STAFF MATERIAL 2-3.
[Vo1.119:485
19711 THE FAILURE OF THE WORK INCENTIVE (WIN) PROGRAM 495
TABLE 167
AFDC RECIPIENTS AND WIN ENROLLEES
Appropriate Actually WIN
Total for Referral Referred Enrollees
Adult AFDC by State by State After
AFDC Recipients Welfare Welfare Labor Dep't
Recipients Assessed Agency Agency Reevaluation
2,150,000 1,810,578 374,177 282,380 164,348
(84.2% of (17.4% of (13.1% of (7.6% of
total) total) total) total)
(20.7% of (15.6% of (9.1% of
assessed) assessed) assessed)
Figures as of May 31, 1970
As the figures illustrate, the high elimination rate at each stage
of the selection process means that only a small percentage of the
adult AFDC population is ultimately enrolled in WIN for either work
or training. Of the 1,810,578 assessed as of May 31, 1970, only
164,348 adults-7.6 percent of the adult AFDC population, 9.1 percent
of those assessed-have been found enrollable in WIN. To meet the
prediction of 757,000, the number of appropriate recipients must in-
crease dramatically; but, barring an unforeseen growth in AFDC rolls,
the potential for expansion of the program appears slight.
The error of the congressional assumption about the nature of the
AFDC population is also demonstrated by comparing the number of
enrollees placed in jobs with the number placed in occupational and
pre-occupational training.
TABLE 116
PLACEMENT OF ENROLLEES
WIN
Enrollees After Occu- Pre-occu-
Labor Dep't Ent- pational pational
Reevaluation ployed Training Training Holding Dropout
209,761 34,181 31,318 32,237 27,118 84,907
(16.3%) (14.9%) (15.4%) (12.9%) (40.5%)
Figures as of October 31, 1970
As shown by Table II, as of October 31, 1970, only 34,181 were
employed. This represents 16.3 percent of the total enrollment, 1.9
67 Monthly Status Reports for WIN (May 31, 1970).
68 The data appears in Division of Reports Analysis, Office of Manpower Mgmt.
Data Systems, Manpower Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, WIN Program Data,
Transmittal No. 97, at 1 of 15, Dec. 16, 1970 [hereinafter cited as WIN Program
Data], except for the "employed" figure. This figure was calculated by adding
12,881 participants who have not completed their follow-up counseling to the 20,397
who have completed the job entry period and the 903 in special works projects.
Telephone interview with Richard Shirey, Manpower Specialist, Manpower Admin.,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Jan. 4, 1971.
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percent of the total assessed (that is, of the total assessed as of May
31, 1970, as indicated in Table I; the percentage would be less as of
October 31, 1970, because more recipients will have been assessed),"
and 1.6 percent of the total adult AFDC population (also as of May
31, 1970). Moreover, 24 percent of the AFDC recipients referred to
WIN (as of August 1969) had been out of work fourteen weeks or
less,70 indicating that they likely could have returned to the labor
market without WIN's efforts or training.
Of those referred but not employed, 31,318 (14.9 percent) were
receiving occupational training and 32,237 (15.4 percent) were re-
ceiving pre-occupational training. Thus, of those in training, 50.7
percent were involved in pre-occupational training, not yet ready for
occupational training. Of those 32,237 in pre-occupational training,
21,552 "' (33.9 percent of all those in training) were in the basic
education and general educational development programs. Thus, of
the total WIN program, presumably filled with the most employable
or trainable of the adult AFDC population, 10.3 percent of those en-
rolled have been placed in programs indicating that they need basic
educational skills before job training or employment can even begin.
The dropout rate of WIN enrollees is another indication of the
erroneous assumptions made about the employability or trainability of
the adult AFDC recipients. There have been 84,907 dropouts as of
October 31, 1970. Of these, 21,400 (25.2 percent) left without good
cause and 63,507 (74.8 percent) left for good cause.' The high rate
of failure for good cause may indicate that too many referrals are in
fact inappropriate for WIN. Those dropouts without good cause may
also have been inappropriate for referral and, once forced into WIN
training, so frustrated and demeaned that they risked the loss of welfare
grants rather than continue.
Supporting the assertion that many dropouts were inappropriately
referred is the correlation of the dropout rate with the length of time
spent in holding.73 Enrollees in holding often present difficult training
problems which rather than solved are avoided by delay. "The diffi-
cult cases continue to be in holding . . . without any immediate
goal." "' The WIN dropouts generally had spent more time in holding
than had the successful enrollees. The median holding time for WIN
graduates was about six weeks; for dropouts, thirteen weeks. '
Thus the congressional assumption of a large body of employable
and trainable AFDC recipients has not proved correct. Not only have
69 The figures on assessments are available only as of May 31, 1970. Shirey
interview, supra note 68. Thus the comparisons made are not exact.
10 WIN Review 3.
71 WIN Program Data 1 of 12.7 2 Id. 1 of 15.
7 3 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
7 4 Auerbach Report, pt. 1, at 9.
75 WIN First Annual Report 18.
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very few AFDC recipients been found appropriate for referral to WIN,
but those who have been referred are likely to require fundamental pre-
vocational training prior to vocational training or employment. Fur-
ther, the number of referrals with even the same low level of skills as
the current enrollees may be expected to drop rather than rise because
most of the employable recipients have already been taken from the
welfare rolls.
The congressional assumption that WIN would train its enrollees
in skills or jobs for which there is a demand in the economy has also
proved wrong: WIN training often fails to provide the enrollees with
new skills, and the skills that it does provide are those least in demand
in the economy," especially during this period of economic re-
trenchment.
As already noted,"7 WIN enrollees are not being trained for the
right jobs for their skills, and are often enrolled in training classes
below their skill level. And even after they have purportedly been
trained, they do not easily enter the labor market.
A notably increasing proportion of the growing numbers
in component holding are those reported to have been last
engaged in institutional training. The August 1969 report
shows 18.4% in this situation. One wonders if these en-
rollees generally are job ready. Having been trained through
institutional vocational education, the next step normally is
placement. . . . [S]pecial attention is needed in local offices
in order that institutional training will be relevant to live
employment opportunities and that WIN enrollees will be
exposed to such job opportunities. 8
The Department of Labor has adopted the policy that WIN train-
ing must be oriented toward jobs in the "demand occupations" either
in the long or short run, and toward "career ladder" jobs rather than
dead-end, low-paying jobs."9 But WIN training programs have been
7G The three leading occupational categories for employed WIN enrollees are:
clerical and sales (21.5% of total employed), service (20.6%), and structural work
(142%). Office of Manpower Mgmt. Data Systems, Manpower Admin., U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Results of Special Occupational and Wage Survey of Employed WIN
Program Participants in Follow-up Status Conducted in Six States as of August
31, 1969, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Six-State Study], discussed at note 89 infra.
In October 1970, the unemployment rate for clerical workers was 4.7%, up 1.3%
from October 1969; for sales workers, 4.3%-up 0.8%. These two categories had
the highest unemployment rate and showed the largest increase of all white-collar
occupations. The unemployment rate for service workers was 5.8%, up 1.6%. Among
construction workers, the rate was 11.9% in October 1970, up 4.6% from the pre-
ceding October, the highest rate and highest rise of any industry. MONTHLY LAB.
REv., Dec. 1970, at 69 (table 8) (published by Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Labor).
77 Text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
78 WIN Review 13.
79 For example, the Manpower Administration does not approve training pro-
grams for domestics. When Delaware attempted to establish such a training program
Louis Day, WIN Regional Director, Manpower Administration, stated that the
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modelled after earlier programs also intended to train the chronically
unemployed. Studies made during the first eighteen months of WIN's
operation indicate that WIN does not vary substantially from these
past programs, which have been criticized for providing "little training
experience and meaningless work experience." " And the preponder-
ance of women enrollees has created a serious problem in training
enrollees for "demand occupations":
The local job market . . . particularly the rural areas,
hold[s] few jobs for women without advanced clerical
skills. WIN staff in these areas anticipated that it would be
a matter of years bringing most WIN enrollees up to the
required skill levels. The few jobs available to most of the
women enrollees were primarily limited to low paying, highly
unstable service jobs such as domestics or charwomen."'
Furthermore, those most liable to be laid off or unemployed,
especially in a slumping economy, are those who populate the WIN
program. The President's Commission on Income Maintenance found
that "young people without work experience, people with low educa-
tional attainments, and members of minority groups subject to dis-
crimination will be particularly handicapped in their search for employ-
ment." s In April 1970, the WIN population was 71 percent female,3
40 percent black," and 22 percent Spanish surnamed; 5 68 percent had
not completed high school, 25 percent had not even entered high
school, 6 and 22 percent were under the age of 22 ."s
intent of WIN was to assist enrollees in securing and retaining employment with
possibilities for advancement. The purpose of WIN is not just training or employ-
ment; it is employment with a future. Interview with Louis Day, Middle-Atlantic
Regional Director of WIN, Manpower Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, in Phila.,
Dec. 15, 1969. An examination of the Connecticut WIN program in 1969 found
that 473 recipients were in some kind of training; only 233 in vocational training
and the rest in prevocational training. Of the 233, 75 were being trained as hair-
dressers (raising the question whether the Connecticut job market could absorb
75 more hairdressers). Other major categories included 17 being trained as licensed
practical nurses, 20 as keypunch operators, and 15 as clerk-typists. Arthur D.
Little Co., Connecticut Welfare Study 190, 193 (1969). Louis Houff, WIN Man-
power Development Specialist, Manpower Administration, indicated that the jobs
for which many enrollees were being trained in Connecticut did not comply with
the career ladder criteria. Telephone interview with Louis Houff, Mar. 2, 1970.
80 Hausman, supra note 52, at 506.
81 Auerbach Report, pt. 2, at 9.
82 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, POVERTY AMID
PLENTY: THE AMERICAN PARADox 25-26 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE].
8 WIN First Annual Report, table 2. On employment difficulties for women
heading families, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE 30.
8 WIN First Annual Report, table 2.
85 Id.
S6 Id.
87 Id.
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The economic slowdown has also caused a reduction in on-the-job
training programs which are no longer supported by employers forced
to lay off longtime employees.1
8
The second assumption has thus proven incorrect. The failure
can be ascribed partly to inadequate training programs which fail to
prepare enrollees properly, and must be ascribed partly to the contra-
dictory policies of training people for jobs while attempting to eliminate
those jobs from the economy.
The third assumption-that the participants in the WIN program
who found employment would earn enough to make assistance un-
necessary-has likewise proved unwarranted. A special six-state
Department of Labor survey of 4,623 employed WIN participants 8 o in
follow-up status 0 found that only 42.2 percent of the men and 9.9
percent of the women had sufficient earnings to be ineligible for
assistance. Median hourly wages for men were $2.47 but only $2.02
for women."' The low figures for women enrollees reflect the generally
lower earnings of women in our society, 2 but they are especially sig-
nificant for the WIN program: 71 percent 9 3 of WIN enrollees and
95 percent of all adult AFDC recipients are women. 4
Finally, Congress also assumed, as indicated by the statement of
goals in the Act itself, that "the example of a working adult in these
[AFDC] families will have beneficial effects on the children in such
families." " Apparently these beneficial effects were presumed to flow
from the "sense of dignity, self-worth, and confidence" an AFDC
88 See id. 31.
89 Six-State Study 1. The six states were California, Colorado. Illinois, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Of the 4,623 individuals surveyed, 2,100 were
from California.
90 For a description of "follow-up" status, see text accompanying note 35 supra.
91 Six-State Study 7. Average hourly earnings were as follows:
Average Hourly Number of
Earnings Participants Percent
under $1.60 180 3.9
$1.60-1.99 1,312 28.4
$2.00-2.49 1,493 32.3
$2.50-2.99 887 19.2
$3.00 or more 751 16.292 More than one third of the 26.9 million women employed in the United States
in 1967 had a "low-paying" position, such as saleswoman, service worker, laborer,
and farm worker. In 1965, the median annual income of women who worked full-
time at such jobs was $2,784. Carter, The Employment Potential of AFDC Mothers:
Some Questions and Some Answers, 6 WELFARE IN REv., July-Aug. 1968, at 1, 3
(citing Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women in the Labor Force, 1966
and 1967, Jan. 31, 1968). Women from poor families are even more limited: "In
1966 almost 50 percent of all employed white women heading poor families and
75 percent of nonwhite women heading poor families worked in service occupations,
one of the lowest paid groups. For many such women, Public Assistance offers a
more secure existence." PREsDNxT's CoMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE 30.
93 WIN First Annual Report, mpra note 38, at table 2 (as of Apr. 30, 1970).
"The data suggest that many welfare mothers, after training and employment, will
not be able to make enough wages to bring their families entirely out of poverty."
Id. 22-23.
94WIN Review 2.
95 Social Security Act § 430, 42 U.S.C. § 630 (Supp. V, 1970).
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parent would derive "from being recognized as a wage-earning member
of society," 9" or simply from the mere fact that the parent worked.
But one study suggests that "the mother's working is only one of
many factors impinging on children and . . . on the whole it is
a secondary rather than a primary factor, so far as child development
and adjustment are concerned." " Another researcher states:
Probably much depends upon the nature of the mother's work
and the status it confers. Perhaps the example of serious
interest in outside work on the mother's part makes both her
sons and her daughters value such work more highly.98
The WIN program is not altogether conducive to inspiring in re-
cipients either a "serious interest" in or respect for work. A mother in
effect forced by the WIN program to leave her children for a sub-
stantial part of the day and work at a possibly demeaning job is un-
likely to bring home at the end of the day an appreciation of the
inherent value of work. If the mother is bitter and resentful about her
job, her children will probably not grow up enamored of the world
of work. The "dignity, self-worth, and confidence" assumed by
Congress to flow from "being recognized" as a worker will in fact
never attach to a mother unhappy with her mandatory job and her loss
of supervision over her children. Her perception of herself may change
only to the extent that her estimate of her helplessness increases. As
a WIN consultant to the Department of Labor concluded:
There is a tendency to feel that any job is better than no job
at all. This is not necessarily the view held by the recipients,
nor is it a valid axiom around which a vocational program
can be built. In the first place, certain classes of jobs are
viewed as dead-end and meaningless by applicants ....
Forcing people to accept unappealing, low-pay, dead-end jobs
will not result in program success. 9
CONCLUSION
Were the WIN program simply a well-intentioned failure to
provide jobs for the country's indigent, that would be cause enough for
lament. But WIN may indeed produce positive harm. For example,
the WIN incentive payments, on the whole probably an advantage of
the program, result in unfairness to the nonwelfare working poor (and
may exacerbate any present hostility between the welfare and non-
96Id.
97 E. HERZOG, CHILDREN OF WORKCING MOTHERS 30 (Children's Bureau, Social
Security Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare Pub. No. 382-1960, 1960).
98 Maccoby, Effects Upon Children of Their Mothers' Outside Employment, in
WORK IN THE LIVEs OF MARRIED WoMEN 157 (1958) (Nat'l Manpower Council
Conference proceedings).
99 Auerbach Briefing, supra note 18, at 4.
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welfare poor) because a WIN participant working at a job paying the
same wage as a nonparticipant has a higher income than the latter
(because the WIN participant receives an incentive payment in addi-
tion to his wage).loo
The mandatory character of WIN is another harmful aspect of
the program, resulting in yet another encroachment on recipient
autonomy by those purporting to know recipients' best interests best.
This point was made in various forms during the congressional hear-
ings. Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz stated:
[I]n my judgment . . . an absolute statutory conditioning
of welfare payments on the acceptance of work or work train-
ing would be unwise and impracticable.
I note . . . the lesson of experience from the adminis-
tration of most of the existing work and work training
programs. One of the hardest problems is getting through
with these programs to those who need them most. This
problem could well be aggravated rather than made easier by
a general rule of compulsory training.3 1
Mitchell Ginsberg, presently Dean of Columbia University School of
Social Work, stated:
There is no doubt that employment and training programs
: . . are desirable, and that aggressive efforts to educate low-
income families to their value are crucial. But to require,
rather than to make available, these resources as a condition
for continued financial assistance opens such a wide area of
discretion that it constitutes an open invitation to abuse.'02
That these voices were not heeded is perhaps indicative of the most
harmful aspect of WIN: its reiteration and propagation of erroneous
assumptions about welfare recipients and about the causes of poverty.
WIN intervenes in the poverty cycle at the locus of the individual
rather than the labor market. So long as poverty is viewed as simply
a manifestation of personal failure, congressional antipoverty programs
will be a waste of bureaucratic energy.
Stephen F. Gold
100 Congress clearly recognized this problem, but decided that the remedy was
too expensive:
The committee appreciates the objections to this type of situation which can
be made; but the alternative would have increased the costs of the proposal
about $160 million a year by placing people on the AFDC rolls who now
have earnings in excess of their need for public assistance as determined
under their State plan. In short, the various provisions included in the com-
mittee's bill are designed to get people off AFDC rolls, not put them on.
S. REP. No. 744, supra note 18, at 158.
10 1 Senate WIN Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 796.
102 Id. 945.
